Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1985

Terminal Service v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of
Employment Security : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Money; Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough; attorney for petitioner.
David L. Wilkinson; attorney general; K. Allan Zabel, Winston M. Faux; assistant attorneys general;
attorneys for respondents.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Terminal Service v. Board of Review, No. 198520707.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1985).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/583

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

^•yj^***^

2-0 7'07
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TERMINAL SERVICE CO.,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,

Supreme Court No. 207 07

Defendant/Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER
TERMINAL SERVICE CO.
David L. Wilkinson
Attorney General of Utah
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
by

David R. Money, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &
McDonough
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 5 21-3200

K. Allan Zabel
Special Assistant
Attorneys for Plaintiff/
Attorney General
Petitioner
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
174 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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I.

PERTINENT RULES AND REGULATIONS

Proposed Rules of the Department of Employment
Security, Rule A 71-07-1:5(a)(3)(a)
a.

Culpability

This is the seriousness of the conduct
as it affects continuance of the employment
relationship. The discharge must have been
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm
to the employer's rightful interests. A
discharge would not be considered
"necessary" if it is not consistent with
reasonable employment practices. The
wrongness of the conduct must be considered
in the context of the particular employment
and how it affects the employer's rights.
If the conduct was an isolated incident of
poor judgment and there is no expectation
that the conduct will be continued or
repeated, potential harm may not be shown
and therefore it is not necessary to
discharge the employee.

II.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Respondents contend in their brief that the record
before this Court does not substantiate the presence of the
required factors of knowledge and culpability sufficient to
establish claimant's fault essential for a determination of
ineligibility for unemployment benefits.

Respondents also

contend that a lack of adequate warning and clear, unambiguous
rules consistently enforced by the employer failed to give
claimant the knowledge that his actions would result in

termination.

Finally, respondents assert that claimant's

conduct in this case was not sufficiently serious to rise to
the level of culpability necessary to find fault to satisfy the
termination for "just cause" requirement.
These arguments ignore the clear, undisputed evidence
in the record before this Court, which establishes the
necessary elements for claimant's termination for just cause,
and the Board's decision to the contrary is unsupported by the
record.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THE SERIOUSNESS OF
CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE
CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT.

Respondents have, in effect, asked this Court to
determine the culpability of the claimant by subjectively
determining the seriousness of his conduct in the instant case,
essentially by comparing it to that of claimants in cases from
other jurisdictions.

These cases involve various acts of

misconduct by employees in varied employment situations who
were later dismissed by their employers.

This case law is

inapposite, since the evidence of record clearly establishes
the requisite seriousness of conduct in this specific case.
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Rule A71-07-l:5(a)(3)(a), proposed Rules of the
Department of Employment Security, defines culpability as
follows:
a.

Culpability

This is the seriousness of the conduct
as it affects continuance of the employment
relationship. The discharge must have been
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm
to the employer's rightful interests. A
discharge would not be considered
"necessary" if it is not consistent with
reasonable employment practices. The
wrongness of the conduct must be considered
in the context of the particular employment
and how it affects the employer's
rights . . . .
It is undisputed in the record that the nature of
petitioner Terminal Service Co.'s business of assembly
line-like installation of truck bumpers and performing pick-up
and delivery services is one that requires punctuality and
regular attendance by employees. (R. 0041-42).

Time schedules

need to be met by Terminal based on the demanding and
unrelenting schedules of the railroad trains coming in and out
of Salt Lake City.

(R. 0020 and 0044).

The Rule quoted above clearly sets forth that the
seriousness of conduct in these types of cases is seen in the
context of each "particular employment" and the "actual or
potential harm" to a specific employer.
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Terminal Service Co.

has a different type of business, different needs and different
employment requirements, which are set forth clearly in the
record, than any of the employment situations set forth in the
myriad of cases respondents cite.

Substantial undisputed

evidence is before this Court that Terminal Service Co. is
potentially harmed by conduct such as the claimant's tardiness
and absenteeism due to the petitioner's time constraints and
the flow of its work (R. 0044), and that discharge was
necessary to avoid harming Terminal Service Company's business.
The Board of Review determined that claimant's conduct
was not sufficiently culpable to disqualify him for benefits.
The opposite conclusion is mandated by the facts established in
the record before this Court.

The Board's determination was

therefore not reasonable, and this Court should set aside that
determination as being without substantial support in the
record and hence arbitrary and capricious.
B.

KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT CONDUCT WAS EXPECTED OF
CLAIMANT BY TERMINAL SERVICE CO. IS WELL
SUBSTANTIATED IN THE RECORD.

Respondents contend that the record shows that
claimant lacked the requisite knowledge as to Terminal Service
Co.'s expectations of him in its employment.
Quite the opposite, the record indicates that claimant
knew what conduct was expected of him from the very beginning
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of his employment with Terminal.

Petitioner's company policy

regarding what is required of newly hired employees was
explained in the hearing by a representative of petitioner:.
New employees are told they must have a valid driver's license,
transportation to and from work and must be willing to work
Sunday through Friday, inclusive, 6 days per week. (R. 0041).
Another representative of petitioner testified that "[w]hen he
(claimant) first came to work, I stipulated that he's got to be
here (at work) unless it's an illness or something, and this is
what we (employer and employee) understand."

(R. 0044).

This notification at the onset of employment should be
considered adequate warning and notification of expectations to
an employee, but claimant had further notice and warning.

In

the first few weeks of claimant's employment, claimant admits
he was tardy and that his boss talked to him about his
tardiness.

(R. 0055).

Terminal's work supervisor verified

that this warning took place and that claimant was told "I
cannot have this" absenteeism and tardiness.

(R. 0044).

Claimant admits that he knew the company policy was
that he was to ask for days off in advance, and that he had
done it plenty of times.

(R. 0056 and 0049)

In fact, it is

undisputed that just the week before the absenteeism for which
termination occurred, the claimant asked Terminal's
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representative for Sunday off and was told that if he didn't
come in, "just don't come back to work", and that he would be
fired for not coming to work.

(R. 0056 and 0050)

All these occurrences clearly gave adequate warning of
what conduct was expected of the claimant by petitioner.

The

record is clear that claimant knew it was very important that
he be at work.

Therefore, the Board of Review's finding that

"the employer had not documented the claimant's past tardies or
absences or its warnings to the claimant that he would be
terminated in the event he was again absent or tardy" is not
supported by any evidence in the record.

These warnings and

notice of what conduct was expected of claimant by petitioner
were essentially admitted by the claimant in the hearing.

The

Board's finding to the contrary was unsupported by any evidence
before it and should accordingly be set aside by this Court.
Respondents contend a lack of knowledge or warning to
claimant through alleged inconsistencies of the petitioner,
characterized by respondents as "discrimination."

The matter

of discrimination is simply not an issue in this case, and is
not a valid basis for asserting lack of knowledge by claimant.
In their brief, respondents assert that petitioner did
not dispute claimant's general allegation that other employees
had also been tardy or absent and had not been terminated.
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This statement is not supported by the record.

Petitioner's

representative said that to his recollection he did not know of
"a situation where an employee would come in without calling or
didn't show up without calling and he was not terminated."
(R. 0052)

Terminal's representative testified that "race,

color, sex or religion plays no part in the way an employee is
treated. . . " (R. 0020), and that all employees are treated in
the same manner.
The Board, however, found that "employees were allowed
to be absent without similar disciplinary action being taken
against them."

This finding was not based on any competent

evidence before it, and can only conceivably be traced to
claimant's conclusory statements to this effect, made without
foundation and without specifics.

(R. 0055-56)

Respondents would ask this Court to draw a number of
conclusions unsubstantiated by the evidence in the record
regarding claimant's lack of understanding and knowledge of the
conduct expected of him by petitioner.

In essence, respondents

would have this Court speculate as to what the claimant knew or
understood, when that understanding is established by the
evidence of record.
Respondents argue that the record shows that
petitioner's employees take turns having Sunday off (R. 0057),
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and that claimant could therefore expect it was his turn to
have the Sunday in question off.

To the contrary, petitioner's

representative stated in the record that every employee works 6
days a week including every Sunday (R. 0041 and 0042) unless
they specifically request a day off (R. 0049), and claimant
admitted that an employee had to ask for a day off two or three
days ahead of time.

(R. 0049)

The evidence does not support a

finding, as argued by respondents, that claimant expected his
employer to authorize Sunday off by claimant's calling in
fifteen minutes before his shift was to begin.
Claimant did not state, as asserted by respondents,
that he expected the petitioner to send transportation to pick
him up to take him to work on Sunday if he were needed and if
petitioner wanted him to come to work.

The offer of a ride to

work was a general one made earlier to claimant that he took
advantage of on at least one occasion.

(R. 0053)

Nor did

claimant state that he was under compulsion analogous to
illness to get his truck repaired.

The record shows that on

Monday the claimant felt a strong need to have the truck moved
from where it had stalled, but told his girlfriend to pass the
message to his boss that he would be in to work later.
0055)

(R.

Claimant was aware of the open offer of a ride to work

whenever his truck broke down.

(R. 0053)
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The Board of Review's finding of claimant's lack of
knowledge of the conduct expected of him is thus not supported
by any substantial evidence in the record and must be
considered unreasonable. This Court should therefore set aside
the Board's ruling, rather than reach for unsupported
conclusions, as respondents would have this Court do.

CONCLUSION
The record establishes that claimant had adequate
warning that absenteeism and tardiness could and would not be
tolerated by his employer.

Claimant clearly understood the

company policy on requesting days off and knew what conduct was
expected of him.
The seriousness of claimant's conduct, supported by
substantial evidence in the record, rises to the level of
culpability needed to establish fault to require a
disqualification for unemployment benefits.
The Board's decision is thus not supported by the
evidence of record and must be considered arbitrary and
unreasonable.

Petitioner Terminal Service Co. therefore

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Board's
decision granting the claimant unemployment benefits, with
instructions to enter an Order for petitioner declaring that
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the claimant was discharged for just cause and awarding
petitioner recovery of all benefits assessed against petitioner,
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of November, 1985.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH

BYMAA^JC
D a v i d R. Moi

Attorneys for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of November,
1985, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four copies of
the foregoing Petitioner's Reply Brief to:

K. Allan Zabel
Special Assistant Attorney General
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
174 Social Hall Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
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